Strategy and Outcomes:
CDCs were selected based on a strong track record of implementing large-scale housing programs in their respective communities. The initiative planned to build on this success to address pressing economic and social concerns as identified by residents. CCRP's strategy called for the CDCs to take the lead in developing the plan for their communities because of their deep understanding of the needs in their neighborhoods. A number of strategies were used from the outset to help guide the initiative. They included: (1) the use of community plans as a blueprint for change, (2) involvement of residents and local businesses in the planning process, (3) technical assistance to help the CDCs with difficult program elements, (4) focus on achievable and quick results, (5) organizational capacity-building support, (5) funding for CCRP-related staff, and (6) linkages to sources of private and government funding to sustain CCRP over the long term. Two of the six original CDCs were dropped during the course of the initiative due to performance-related challenges.
Many significant outcomes resulted from the work planned and facilitated by CCRP (Miller and Burns, 2007) :
• Establishment of several new primary health care centers (logging nearly 35,000 patient visits a year); February 1, 2008 • Creation of the New Bronx Employment Service, which placed more than 2,000 residents in jobs; • Restoration of the Bronx River and restoration/creation of nine refurbished/new community parks and playgrounds;
• Development of a new shopping center and state-of-the-art youth recreation center;
• Nearly 2,800 additional units of affordable housing built or rehabilitated; and
• Implementation of a variety of employment and asset-building programs, including the creation of new businesses and savings and micro-loan programs.
Data Use: While the CCRP used data in a number of program-specific ways to support the work of individual CDCs and the initiative as a whole, there was no single comprehensive effort to develop a unified data warehouse. The largest data-related effort involved assistance to help the CDCs improve their management information systems to move beyond case management to support more comprehensive programming; however, these new data systems were largely for "in-house" use by the CDCs. Otherwise, the initiative relied on the standard combination of measuring outputs (e.g. increases in patient visits to new health care services) and outcomes (e.g. number of placements by job training programs) to assess the results of specific programs.
Scope, Scale, and Sustainability
Scope: CCRP developed out of the understanding that the institutions within distressed communities need to be rebuilt in response to social and economic problems. Approaches to community change prior to CCRP largely focused on one aspect of change, such as the CDCs' focus on housing, instead of addressing issues in a comprehensive manner. Nevertheless, CCRP capitalized on the strength of local CDCs to create entities positioned to address community development in a more comprehensive manner. CCRP resources helped the CDCs navigate the technical and operational challenges of broadening their missions to include healthcare, employment, green space, education, and other quality-of-life needs. For the most part, the CDCs adopted an incremental approach to expansion and took on strategies aligned with their core missions and competencies.
CCRP took an integrated approach to program development, which helped the initiative achieve the scope needed to make meaningful improvements. For instance, the South Bronx faced a chronic shortage of health care practitioners and facilities. In addition, there were few local jobs and high unemployment. CCRP integrated the two issues by (1) providing training for nursing and health care administration and (2) building health care facilities; new health care facilities were then able to employ members of the community. February 1, 2008 Scale: CCRP targeted six neighborhoods in the South Bronx; this concentrated geography was conducive to making a difference in community-level outcomes. CCRP's physical redevelopment and open space restoration significantly improved neighborhood safety and quality of life. The provision of primary health care centers and training of resident health practitioners provided critically needed services that had been virtually absent in the community.
Sustainability: Much of the CCRP-initiated work was sustained, largely due to smart initial funding, strategic program design and integration, and the focus on community building. At the end of the demonstration program, CCRP incorporated into an independent nonprofit organization to function as an alliance among the four participating CDCs. While CCRP, Inc., is no longer an operating entity, the four South Bronx CDCs that participated in CCRP continue their partnerships and collaboration. Quality-of-life physical plans and strategic neighborhood action plans continue to guide and inspire South Bronx revitalization efforts. February 1, 2008 Health Improvement Initiative
Principal Sponsor(s):
The California Wellness Foundation . Six sites with more focused program activities were added later. The goal of the HII was to improve the overall population health in its target areas through: (1) identifying and creating systems changes, (2) providing direct preventive services, and (3) measuring population health. The HII governance structure used a lead agency, with each grantee creating (or using an existing) community collaborative of key stakeholders, called a health partnership. The foundation funded four types of support: direct technical assistance; measurement (e.g. public opinion polling); evaluation; and assistance with organization, meetings, and logistics. The HII also created the California Center for Health Improvement, the first state-wide, independent organization focused on health policy.
Strategy and Outcomes:
Marking a change from most community health programs, the HII focused on systemic factors directly affecting the health of the population as a whole in each of its sites. To support an initiative with such a broad scope, the California Wellness Foundation set aside the first year of the initiative for planning and capacitybuilding efforts to support the health partnerships, in addition to funding a wider-thanaverage array of technical assistance supports. Another unique strategic approach was the creation of the CCHI to work directly with policymakers at the state level, to provide a mechanism for the communication of programs, policies, and data from the sites. The HII focused its activities on four areas: (1) service integration, (2) results-basedbudgeting, (3) data integration, and (4) policy development. Evaluations found that the strategy of using the CCHI to create a "learning community" among the sites to support the diffusion of data, best practices, and other critical information was especially effective. Notable outcomes of the HII include:
• The delivery of significant direct services, including 24,450 instances of highintensity services (defined as one-on-one encounters, such as case management or mentoring) and 42,949 instances of medium-intensity services (defined as group or more indirect encounters, such as health education classes or support groups); February 1, 2008
• Implementation of multiple systems reforms initiatives, with evaluators reporting that six of the nine sites played a critical role in advancing systems changes and that a total of 30 systems reforms efforts was undertaken, of which 21 had been completed at the time of the evaluation; and
• The creation of the CCHI, now the Center for Health Improvement, which has evolved into an independent nonprofit that plays a significant, ongoing role in disseminating the results of the HII and related initiatives and promoting health policy development at the state and local levels.
Use of Data:
The HII provides an interesting example of how a CCI can effectively use data to influence directly the policymaking process. One HII strategy unique among the initiatives reviewed for this study was the commissioning of opinion polls on population health issues, in part to demonstrate to elected and other state and local government officials where popular support existed for particular programs, strategies, and issues.
Another was the creation of the CCHI, which institutionalized the role of data collection and analysis as a stand-alone organization located in the state capitol of Sacramento; the CCHI continues to play a role in influencing systems-level decision-making by providing non-partisan research on population health issues directly to policymakers.
Scope, Scale, and Sustainability
Scope: The HII stands out from other CCIs with regard to scope in (1) the decision to target entire communities as opposed to smaller units such as neighborhoods and (2) an approach that looked at population health as a whole rather than focusing on more specific health issues, policies, and programs. Evaluation findings reveal that important factors in the success of HII were the initial one-year planning period and the availability of technical assistance from the beginning of the initiative, which allowed the individual sites to tailor their efforts to the specific needs of the community while maintaining the overall focus on population health.
Scale:
In terms of scale, an important aspect of HII was the development of an organization (the CCHI) that could act as a vehicle to advance a state-wide agenda for health improvement based in large part on data collected at the nine sites. In addition, the HII used a variety of mechanisms to engage the community as a whole, ranging from public opinion polling to direct intervention through public health education programs. This broad array of both active mechanisms (e.g., classes for community residents) and passive mechanisms (e.g., public service announcements) maximized the reach of different efforts by maximizing the ability of the initiative to engage stakeholders at different levels of activity.
Sustainability:
The HII was very successful in sustaining the work of its health partnerships after the grant cycle. Seven of the nine partnerships continued to function as collaboratives (typically incorporating as nonprofits if not already so structured), with one of the remaining sites spinning off successful programs to individual organizations and the other deciding that a formal partnership structure was not necessary to continue its work. In one evaluation, 90% of the respondents said they would continue to work with other organizations on similar health policy issues in the future. As already mentioned, the CCHI continues to function as an independent state-level organization for non-partisan health policy advocacy, primarily with the California state legislature. February 1, 2008 Local Investment Commission LINC is a staffed organization that supports a 36-member volunteer citizen commission appointed by a state official. Commission members are drawn from many parts of the community, with a majority representing the business community and neighborhood organizations. A professional cabinet consisting of public agency staff, elected officials, and service providers contributes professional advice and support to the citizen commission. LINC utilizes a range of volunteers from the community to serve on working groups and assist with program outreach and implementation. Much of LINC's work has targeted systems reform and improved access to public services through placing services in local neighborhoods. LINC focuses on health care, family services, programs for the aging, the welfare-to-work program, neighborhood involvement, and education in Kansas City.
Strategy and Outcomes:
LINC came into existence in response to public scrutiny over the Kansas City Department of Social Services' ineffectiveness in its social services operations. Those criticizing the department believed that decisions were being made by individuals who did not understand the impact of their decisions on the community at large. Moreover, individuals that helped to shape LINC believed that community members, particularly those of the underrepresented inner city, can isolate specific community problems more effectively than can individuals that serve in government without knowledge of the communities they "control." LINC was intended to give the community a voice in establishing community initiatives and programs and better allocating services; Comprehensive Neighborhood Services (CNS) was the major initiative under LINC that sought to establish citizen empowerment. LINC wanted to carry out four critical functions: (1) engaging, convening, and supporting diverse groups and communities; (2) establishing quality standards and promoting accountability; (3) brokering and leveraging resources; and (4) promoting effective policy measures. Specific outcomes of LINC include:
• Numerous education projects, including an extended school day offered to students who are behind in school, with tutoring provided by teachers working overtime or community tutors; February 1, 2008
• Welfare reform projects, including changes that have enabled over 3,200 people to be placed in jobs; and
• Changes in the Jackson County Department of Social Services, such as a new professional development program for frontline workers, senior managers, and supervisors.
Use of Data:
The development of comprehensive and integrative approaches to the gathering and use of data is a core activity for LINC, with three key areas. First, LINC established the Community Technology Forum, a database that catalogs services provided by over 350 community organizations organized by nine-digit zip code. Second, LINC created a data warehouse that compiles existing data from seven state agencies along with data from the 16 CNS sites in Kansas City. Distinct from a systemwide management information system, the warehouse provides coordinated access to data within different agencies, allowing staff and other partners the flexibility to organize the information to meet their needs. For example, the warehouse allows tracking of services provided to individual families. Third, LINC developed an information sharing system (linked to the warehouse) that tracks services provided at each of the CNS sites; this system can be employed to identify gaps in services, among other uses.
Scope, Scale, and Sustainability
Scope: LINC defines its mission as "creating a caring community that builds on its strengths to provide meaningful opportunities for children, families, and individuals to achieve self-sufficiency, attain their highest potential, and contribute to the common good." Initially, LINC was interested in improving the local office of the Missouri Department of Social Services; over time, the scope of the project expanded to address employment and training, health care, child care, housing, elderly affairs, and education. LINC has successfully used strategies that tackle a social problem from multiple angles. For example, the commission's welfare reform initiative included policy and regulation changes, employment training, job creation, and a performance-based approach to funding service providers, with the result that welfare recipients were able to enter the workforce in a way that enhanced their overall quality of life.
Scale: LINC's focus on systems change and its strategy of channeling programs using the CNS framework has enabled the organization to operate at a scale uncommon among CCIs. For each intervention undertaken, LINC typically designs programs and seeks funding in a way that facilitates going to scale. For instance, LINC funded an afterschool program by capturing untapped state and federal funds in an innovative way, enabling placement of the program in nearly every Kansas City elementary school.
Sustainability: LINC is still going strong, with much of its enduring success due to its systems change approach and strong relationships with both the private and public sectors. In addition, authentic resident empowerment and the emphasis on decision making by individuals acting as citizens, rather than as organizational representatives, have led to strategies, funding, and community capacity building that support meaningful and lasting change. (3) strengthen informal neighborhood networks of support and leadership to build a grassroots foundation for community-building efforts. In each city, the Ford Foundation chose a community foundation to serve as the local intermediary. The community foundation then selected one target neighborhood and developed the "neighborhood collaboratives" that would serve as the governance structure at each site. Each collaborative included residents, business owners and professionals, and representatives from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Across all four sites, general technical assistance and the facilitation of cross-site communication were provided by the Center for Community Change, a national intermediary and technical assistance provider. Seedco, a national community economic development intermediary, received $3 million to provide assistance for specific programs.
Strategy and Outcomes:
The Ford Foundation selected sites with a strong community foundation and neighborhoods that were important units of action capable of being identified and mobilized. Ford chose to use community foundations as intermediaries because of the belief that such foundations would bring local legitimacy to the initiative, provide links to additional resources, and serve as honest brokers in organizing local stakeholders into collaboratives. While strategic planning and the development of specific outcome goals were left to the individual sites, two guiding principles informed the overall approach of the NFI: (1) the goal of moving beyond comprehensive programs to the creation of a "whole strategy" to address the complex relationships among the different challenges facing neighborhoods and (2) the idea that all stakeholders with a vested interest in the neighborhoods should participate to the greatest extent possible in crafting that whole strategy. Specific outcomes of the NHI included:
• Numerous grassroots projects in Hartford, including the creation of the Collaborative Community Council to develop and strengthen neighborhood block clubs, increased street lighting for public safety, the development of summer enrichment and job placement programs for youth, and the rehabilitation of 16 neighborhood homes; February 1, 2008
• In Memphis, creation of the nonprofit Orange Mound Development Corporation (to help construct and rehabilitate housing) and the opening of a family resource center in a local elementary school;
• In Milwaukee, a joint project with four other community-based organizations to purchase 33 acres for development into an industrial park and a job training program that placed over 100 participants with local employers; and
• In Detroit, development of a community policing program, implementation of a job training program that placed over 60 participants with local employers, conversion of 27 apartments into low-income housing, and participation in numerous projects related to the city's Empowerment Zone initiative (a separate federally-funded community development program).
Use of Data:
Evaluations indicate that strategic use of data was not a priority for the NFI. Three reasons were cited: the comparatively small size of most projects, limited resources provided for evaluation, and general skepticism among stakeholders about the utility of tracking community-level outcomes given capacity and resource issues.
Scope, Scale, and Sustainability
Scope: NFI's strategic approach was to identify one neighborhood in each city to allow for the development of truly holistic approaches to improving outcomes for residents. These neighborhoods ranged in size from 9,000 to 20,000 residents, with poverty rates between 29% and 52%. Special emphasis was placed on both building more formal connections among existing stakeholders (e.g., through the creation of alliances and collaboratives) and engaging existing networks of informal support and leadership in the target areas. The ultimate goal of the NFI was to weave programs and groups into a comprehensive agenda for change that could capitalize on naturally occurring connections among different arenas of action.
Scale: Most of the programs developed by the four collaboratives were small in scale. The hope of the Ford Foundation was that the inclusion of "resource" and "bridge" stakeholders would help these efforts grow to scale. According to evaluations, however, the most effective projects were more modest, "medium-sized" efforts, such as the creation in Milwaukee of a revolving loan fund for businesses and the housing development work of the Orange Mound Development Corporation in Memphis. In a similar vein, in Detroit, the collaborative created an infrastructure that allowed the neighborhood to capitalize on the city's participation in the federal Empowerment Zone program, in effect allowing the neighborhood to more effectively access the resources provided by a larger scale initiative. Based on these outcomes, the NFI tended to be supportive rather than generative of large-scale projects.
Sustainability: In Detroit, Hartford, and Memphis, the NFI collaboratives transformed into independent nonprofit organizations that continue the work of the initiative. In Milwaukee, the collaborative disbanded and spun off remaining program activities to other organizations, several of which the collaborative had created. Ultimately, longerterm outcomes were seen more around the development of new institutional and social networks, rather than in the creation of specific programs that persisted after the end of formal Ford Foundation support. February 1, 2008 Neighborhood Improvement Initiative
Principal Sponsor(s): William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
Geographic Focus: San Francisco, California (Bay Area)
Demonstration Period: 1996 -2005 Initiative Profile: The Neighborhood Improvement Initiative was started in 1996 by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation in response to the economic disparities that intensified in the Bay Area with the Silicon Valley boom. The initiative was designed as a comprehensive urban revitalization effort to improve the quality of life for residents in three low-income neighborhoods: Mayfair in east San Jose, the 7 th Street/ McClymonds corridor in West Oakland, and the mid-town/university garden park corridor of East Palo Alto. After an initial planning phase, grants to each of the three NII neighborhoods provided a commitment of $750,000 per year for six years (renewed by Hewlett annually, based on performance); the grants were staggered, with the Mayfair grant awarded in 1996, West Oakland in 1998, and East Palo Alto in 1999. In each of the communities, Hewlett acted as the sponsor, granting management authority to a local community foundation. Each community foundation, in turn, worked with local groups to set up resident bodies to govern implementation. The NII was intended to accomplish six goals:
(1) connect fragmented efforts to address poverty-related issues in selected communities, (2) improve the capacity of participating community-based organizations, (3) improve the capacity of Bay Area community foundations to support neighborhood improvement strategies, (4) create a vehicle for increasing resident involvement in neighborhood planning and improvement strategies, (5) leverage significant public/private resources to support community improvement, and (6) provide statistical evidence of changes in poverty indicators over a long-term period.
Strategy and Outcomes:
NII's strategy was to allow residents to drive community planning and implementation over a demonstration period of several years until the community was capable of assuming more direct control over change efforts. The community planning process generated a set of priority issues and indicated the types of services and supports needed. To support the local planning efforts, Hewlett created partnerships with two local universities, Stanford and the University of California at Berkeley, to help provide responsive research, technical assistance, and evaluation supports. The outcomes of the initiative varied significantly by site. The West Oakland initiative was dissolved due to continual board and staff turnover and an inability to engage community partners; nevertheless, the West Oakland site did help facilitate the shutdown of a yeast factory that was a large source of air-pollution in the neighborhood. In East Palo Alto, neighborhood block clubs were formed to address neighborhood safety and cleanup and improve relations between residents and the police. In addition, East Palo Alto initiated an after-school program to provide academic supports to students and an ESL training program for parents. Mayfair had greater success in making significant physical improvements, providing affordable housing, and incubating new businesses. February 1, 2008 Use of Data: The NII is another initiative that experienced ongoing challenges around the acquisition and use of data (Brown & Fiester, 2007) . Reasons cited include the absence of specific outcomes clearly linked to the theories of change developed by the sites, the number of small-scale projects that made it difficult to link programs to results, and a relatively late shift in emphasis by the Hewlett Foundation toward tracking outcomes data.
Scope, Scale, and Sustainability
Scope: The three neighborhoods were chosen because of their social and economic isolation and level of physical deterioration. NII wanted to create change by making improvements in the physical, economic, and social aspects of these neighborhoods, thereby creating a safe community that would attract investment and jobs. Each site composed a preliminary plan after a year of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the neighborhood and its residents. Based on this plan, improvements were to be accomplished through coordinated and effective services, improved operational and financial capacity of community-based organizations, increased resident involvement in neighborhood improvement efforts, increased investment in the target neighborhoods, and improved neighborhood-level outcomes.
Scale: Most elements of NII operated at a relatively modest scale. For example, Mayfair's health education initiative enrolled nearly 1,000 children in health insurance; more than 500 adults in the Mayfair site have participated in adult literacy, ESL, and computer training. East Palo Alto provides ESL education to approximately 250 adults per year, and about 100 students participated in the after-school program to improve literacy and study skills.
Sustainability: While the West Oakland site was dissolved four years into the initiative, the other two sites continue to run and modestly expand their programs. NII's intensive organizational capacity building created local institutions that are now positioned to address community problems. This is particularly true in Mayfair, where community building and resident engagement have strengthened the social fabric of the neighborhood. 1993 -1997 Initiative Profile: The Neighborhood Preservation Initiative funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts constituted a three-year investment in ten working-class neighborhoods across nine large metropolitan areas. NPI's founding premise was two-fold: often, working-class neighborhoods are overlooked by foundations and government agencies because they are not the most distressed; at the same time, these neighborhoods are vulnerable and subject to deterioration due to neglect. Through the NPI, Pew sought to make small, preventive investments in working-class communities to prevent despair, along with the larger, sustained investments that would be needed to repair blighted communities. Sites originally labeled "working class" were selected; residents, however, characterized these neighborhoods as "transitional," to place emphasis on the fact that they were experiencing negative changes (in crime, unemployment, and civic participation rates, for example) that needed to be addressed to avoid desolation.
As a result of its funding strategy, NPI evolved into a partnership among Pew, local foundations, and community organizations. To qualify for funding, each community had to meet two criteria: (1) a total population exceeding one million residents and (2) presence of a community foundation with annual grant activity totaling $2.5 million at a minimum. Pew made three-year project grants totaling $6.6 million to nine community foundations; foundations received up to $800,000 over three years on the condition of a 50% local match. On average, sites retained a $1-million budget for each of the three years of the initiative.
The goals of the initiative were to: (1) help existing neighborhood-based organizations visibly improve their communities, (2) build the capacity of neighborhood-based organizations to sustain long-term improvements, (3) stimulate new public and private investments in working-class neighborhoods, and ultimately (4) move working-class neighborhoods in a positive direction. Local foundations provided technical assistance via conferences and cross-site peer learning, in addition to progress monitoring, for sites.
Strategy and Outcomes:
NPI focused specifically on four areas of intervention: crime prevention, economic opportunity, physical revitalization, and youth development.
The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government conducted an evaluation of NPI, and the Cornerstone Consulting Group produced two evaluative reports with lessons learned. Reported outcomes based on visual and anecdotal data include: February 1, 2008
• Expanded employment opportunities;
• Increased access to public transportation;
• Economic redevelopment of commercial districts; • Improved housing stock;
• Rehabilitation of blighted housing units; and
• Maintenance of the owner-renter distribution.
Use of Data:
Unlike most national initiatives, NPI did not prioritize data-driven strategies and outcomes. While the program was evaluated, quantitative measures were limited primarily to outputs.
Scope, Scale, and Sustainability
Scope: The four areas of NPI intervention (crime prevention, economic opportunity, physical revitalization, and youth development) were identified as "critically important for neighborhood stability." Grantees across sites implemented programs in at least one of these areas; each site was responsible for designing programs that best met local needs and resident priorities. Ultimately, the community was responsible for delegating resources across the area(s) of intervention.
According to NPI's guiding strategic philosophy, energy and commitment from community groups produce the greatest "bang for the buck" in community revitalization efforts. Because of this philosophy, NPI was community-driven, focusing more effort on energizing the commitment of community groups than on improving specific activities; strong community involvement was therefore critical to strategizing and implementing plans for change.
Scale: NPI was unique in its strategy of making small investments in transitional neighborhoods to prevent large-scale decline. The success of NPI in achieving community-level outcomes is uncertain, given the relative paucity of outcome data. Limited results in Kansas City showed a 28% increase in home prices from 1995 to 1999.
Sustainability: Several years after the end of the initiative, many of the programs initiated by NPI at local agencies remained in operation. NPI's emphasis on building capacity and creating visibility for revitalizing working-class neighborhoods (for the purpose of leveraging additional funding) may have helped sustain the initiative. Though organizations were not able to maintain comparable levels of national funding after the initiative ended, they were able to diversify their revenue streams sufficiently to address local needs. Evaluation reports cite the lack of concrete outcome measures as a stumbling block to continuing to obtain additional funding. The Atlanta Project
Principal Sponsor:
The Carter Center
Geographic Focus: Atlanta, Georgia
Demonstration Period: 1991 -1999 Initiative Profile: The Atlanta Project was a $32-million anti-poverty initiative with four major goals: (1) unite Atlanta as a community, (2) foster cooperation among service providers and other groups, (3) foster empowerment, and (4) enhance the quality of life in neighborhoods. Initiated by former President Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center, TAP focused on twenty "clusters" of neighborhoods in Atlanta and three surrounding counties identified as containing high concentrations of poverty. The TAP governance structure consisted of cluster coordinators and their staff housed in public high schools, an "executive advisor" for each cluster provided by a private sector partner, and a steering committee comprised of key stakeholders that coordinated the efforts of smaller volunteer task forces working in six functional areas: health, housing, economic development, education, community development, and public safety. TAP's Collaboration Center, with over 40 staff housed in a downtown office, helped to coordinate programs, seek funding, evaluate programs, provide resources, and facilitate communication among the clusters. A 36-member policy advisory board drawn from high-profile community leaders provided general guidance and links to resources.
Strategy and Outcomes: TAP's strategy was to develop a comprehensive approach to reducing poverty that would empower neighborhood residents by letting individual clusters develop their own strategic plans and specific initiatives. The governance structure of TAP was envisioned as a "process," rather than a "mechanism," one that would eventually disband as the projects within and across clusters became independently sustainable. TAP intentionally avoided a formal connection with local government, in favor of reliance on resource donations from the private sector and local charities, along with the extensive use of volunteers to support the efforts of each cluster. TAP also sought to bridge divides of race and class by directly connecting corporate partners with target neighborhoods through the placement of executive advisors in each of the clusters and the use of volunteers drawn from throughout the Atlanta metropolitan region. Major outcomes of the project included:
• Immunization/Children's Health Initiative, through which 7,000 volunteers went door-to-door to collect data and distribute educational materials, resulting in over 16,000 children seen at immunization sites in a one-week period. This campaign also resulted in the creation of a multi-county computer database to track the health records of all youth in metropolitan Atlanta;
• Georgia Common Access Application, an effort by ten state and federal agencies to consolidate the application forms for government assistance programs into a single document, saving 1.1 million tax dollars for every 100,000 applicants; February 1, 2008 • Community Development Funds, money raised through volunteer efforts and put into a "resource pool" managed by the Metropolitan Atlanta Community Foundation to support grassroots and other nonprofit organizations working in TAP clusters; and • Code Enforcement, which created a manual to educate neighborhood residents on how to report code violations (e.g. abandoned cars, unsafe buildings) and a software program to track those violations.
Use of Data: Data collection and analysis for TAP were handled primarily by the Data and Policy Analysis (DAPA) group coordinated by faculty and students at Georgia Tech University. The core mission of DAPA was the democratization of data by providing neighborhood-level information to individuals and organizations in low-income neighborhoods. This included providing raw data, creating maps (e.g. the number and locations of rental units in a neighborhood), assisting with data analysis, and linking data with policy advice. While DAPA worked with TAP to develop indicators and other measures of community well-being, its work focused on providing data to improve policy, for example, translating information from a community needs assessment into data maps to identify optimal sites for Head Start centers.
Scope, Scale, and Sustainability
Scope: TAP's twenty clusters covered a "priority zone" of 200 square miles with 534,000 residents and 100 identifiable neighborhoods. Clusters were chosen based on poverty level as measured by the number of single-parent households and single mothers. The policy advisory board's choice of the six functional areas defined the scope of the antipoverty agenda, with the development of specific programs and broader strategies left up to individual cluster coordinators and steering committees. Ideally, the Collaboration Center would then help the clusters connect their individual work to create a collective, comprehensive set of larger initiatives to address the multiple sources of poverty in the region. While TAP sought to engage stakeholders across different sectors within metropolitan Atlanta, the initiative focused primarily on the private sector, local charities, and volunteers, with less emphasis placed on building connections with local government and human services providers.
Scale: Aside from several large efforts such as the Children's Health Initiative, TAP decided to forgo building consensus among a wide range of stakeholders and instead "jump-start" its work by pursuing more modest, easier-to-accomplish programs that could later grow to scale. TAP also sought to bridge the region's racial divide by engaging substantial numbers of volunteers to work directly in the target neighborhoods, a strategy that emphasized creating connections among individuals more than institutions.
In theory, this focus on small grassroots programs, neighborhood empowerment, and volunteerism would ultimately develop into a broad coalition and agenda. Because of the emphasis on resident empowerment and the hope that programs would take root at the neighborhood level, TAP avoided the creation of a formal governance structure in favor of a more decentralized approach. February 1, 2008 Use of Data: HFP evolved as a result of several programs, including the Health Care for the Homeless Program co-funded by the RWJF and Pew Charitable Trusts in 1985. The evaluation of this program led to the creation of the fist substantive, multi-city dataset on characteristics of the homeless population. Despite the rich, data-driven history of HFP, the initiative was not characterized by rigorous data use.
Scope: Research supporting the guiding principals of the initiative showed that often, homeless families are headed by women with a history of mental health problems, domestic violence victimization, and drug abuse; a majority of these families do not receive social services to address their needs. HFP aimed to stabilize homeless families by providing adequate social services facilitated by case managers assigned to each family in the program. Families in the program needed help in multiples areas, including physical and mental health, substance abuse, education and training, and child care. Case managers met with families on a regular basis to assess their needs and coordinate services.
Scale:
The scale of the initiative was modest; 1,670 families were accepted into the program and approximately 1,300 families entered services-enriched housing. Though these numbers are small compared to other national initiatives, the focus on femaleheaded families is likely to have made a sizeable dent in addressing the larger homelessness problem in each of these sites, and lessons learned about offering comprehensive social services to homeless families may have been applied to the general homeless population.
Sustainability:
Evaluations of the Homeless Families Program showed that the initiative was successful in improving awareness of the high percentage of homeless families headed by young females. Furthermore, the initiative saw systems change (changes in the role of the public housing authority and its perception of the needs of female-headed homeless households) and "systems fixes" (changes in the utilization of caseworkers for homeless families). After five years, 60% of homeless families that participated in the program continued to be stably housed. February 1, 2008 Urban Health Initiative 1995 -2005 Initiative Profile: The Urban Health Initiative was a five-site, ten-year, $60.75-million investment by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to make a measurable impact on children's health and safety by taking proven programmatic strategies to scale through community-wide systems reform. The UHI targeted five major urban areas across the country, with each community identifying or developing a "change agent" (either a lead agency or collaborative of organizations) to provide leadership and manage the initiative. The role of these governance entities was to (1) work with the community to identify the outcomes to be achieved, (2) identify best practices, (3) gather and use data to guide the decision-making process, and (4) change policies at a program and systems levels. A national program office originally located in the School of Public Health at the University of Washington acted as the intermediary, eventually becoming an independent nonprofit, the Institute for Community Change.
Strategy and Outcomes:
The strategic approach of the UHI was to operationalize the definition of "scale" by identifying clear, quantitative measures for the goals each site hoped to achieve. For example, each site completed the "denominator exercise," to determine how many children would have to be reached by a particular service strategy to make a measurable change in the statistical outcomes and how much money that would cost. Rather than provide direct services, each site focused on recruiting stakeholder buyin for identified best practices, diverting funding to support the adoption of these best practices, and then institutionalizing these practices within the community. A central strategic assumption of the UHI was that broad-scale systems change could not happen without the support of city bureaucracies and the population as a whole. Based on this assumption, each site developed a political strategy and a communications campaign, a much more intentional and direct approach to the politics of systems reform than that of other CCIs. Overall, the UHI sought to marry the more typical neighborhood focus of previous CCIs with a truly community-wide, systemic approach to improving children's health and safety. Major outcomes included:
• Philadelphia's development of a children's budget to track funding streams for youth/family programs; development of a children's report card to gather and track data on outcomes; and implementation of eleven Beacon programs, schoolbased centers that provide education, early care, youth development, and job training services;
• Oakland's creation of an integrated human services program at seven of its most troubled middle schools, which placed a three-person team at each site to February 1, 2008 coordinate the delivery of mental health, anti-violence, family development, and youth outreach programs; and • Detroit's success in negotiating with their mayor to divert $400 million in casino revenue over twenty years to rehabilitate city recreation centers; support afterschool programs; and establish the Michigan After-School Partnership, now its own agency in the state government's department of education, to manage the new programs.
Use of Data:
The UHI stands out among the CCIs reviewed here with regard to its thoughtful, strategic, and wide-ranging use of data to inform and influence programs and policies. At the initiative level, all sites were required to track outputs and outcomes and report the results of their tracking every six months to the national program office. Individually, sites gathered and used data in a number of innovative ways, with Philadelphia Safe and Sound perhaps most exemplary in this regard. In addition to the children's budget and report card, now used by local government officials in a number of decision-making processes, the site developed an integrated data information system that allows for exchange of data among the city's school district, police department, and other agencies to support the development of more comprehensive services. Safe and Sound also provides geographic information to support the work of service agencies, allowing agencies to map gaps in services by looking at housing, health, crime, early childhood, and other relevant indicators. Finally, Safe and Sound partnered with the city to develop a performance-based contracting system to assess the success of private sector providers by tracking improvements in client outcomes.
Scope, Scale and Sustainability
Scope: The UHI focused on the entire metropolitan area at each of its sites and covered a broad range of policy arenas related to health and human services, making it one of the larger CCIs. Each site engaged in a two-year planning process to identify key health and safety indicators for the community, gather data related to those measures, and identify the type and amount of resources that would need to be shifted to make significant progress toward outcome goals. UHI is notable also for its strategy of identifying other major federal and foundation initiatives underway at the sites, then developing partnerships and leveraging resources in collaboration with these other efforts.
Scale: Unlike most CCIs, UHI incorporated an explicit strategy to address scale. UHI emphasized policy development and systems change rather than service provision. The most critical factor in achieving scale was the ability to understand the meaning of "scale" in terms of the number of children or families that would have to be reached to make a positive change in community-level indicators. Armed with this information, sites were able to design strategies and estimate resources required to go to scale. For instance, Baltimore's family support strategy targeted 13,000 families at a cost of $46 million. Philadelphia's after-school program targeted 96,000 children at a cost of $150 million.
